In re Perez by Traynor, Roger J.
University of California, Hastings College of the Law
UC Hastings Scholarship Repository
Opinions The Honorable Roger J. Traynor Collection
9-21-1966
In re Perez
Roger J. Traynor
Follow this and additional works at: http://repository.uchastings.edu/traynor_opinions
This Opinion is brought to you for free and open access by the The Honorable Roger J. Traynor Collection at UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Opinions by an authorized administrator of UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. For more information, please
contact marcusc@uchastings.edu.
Recommended Citation
Roger J. Traynor, In re Perez 65 Cal.2d 224 (1966).
Available at: http://repository.uchastings.edu/traynor_opinions/523
) 
.~ 
224 IN BE PEREZ [65C.2d 
[Crim. No.1003L In Bank. Sept. 21, 1966.] 
. In re GEORGE ANTHONY PEREZ on Habeas Corpus. 
[1] Habeas Corpus-Petition-Time for Filing.-Defendant's delay . 
of almost tliree years in applying for a writ of habeas corpus 
on the grounds that he was denied the aid of counsel when 
judgment and sentence were pronounced was sufliciently 
explained by allegations that he had not completed the seventh 
grade in school at the time he entered state prison, that he 
knew nothing of legal rights or procedures, and that he has 
diligently used the limited opportunities available to prisoners . 
for legal research in the preparation of legal documents. 
[2a-2d] Criminal Law - Probation - Revocation: Sentence -
Formalities in Passing Sentence-Presence of Defendant and. 
Oounsel.-A probationer unconstitutionally sentenced under 
former P.en. Code, § 1203.2a, following his commitment for 
another offense, is in the same position he would be had there 
been no such statute. That is, unless he competently waives his 
right to be present and represented by counsel when judgment 
is pronounced, he is entitled to proper arraignment for judg-
ment, and the court that originally granted probation is not 
deprived of jurisdiction to impose sentence by the provision in 
formel" § 1203.2a, nullifying jurisdiction for failure to pro-
nounce judgment within 30 days. 
[3] Id.-Proceedi,gs on Issue of Mentally Disordered Sex 01rend-
er.-Proceedings leading to commitments of mentally dis-
ordered sex offenders begin with and rest on the conviction of 
a "criminal offense" (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 5501); and though a 
probationers confinement in prison was not under a commit-
ment based on a judgment of conviction of crime, but 
commitment as a sexual psychopath, that commitment was "for 
another offense" within the meaning of former Pen. Code, 
§ 1203.2a, requiring a court that granted probation without 
imposing sentence, on being notified of the probationers 
commitment to prison for another offense, to impose sentence 
or otherwise terminate its jurisdiction in the case. 
[1] See Oal.Jur.2d, Habeas Corpus, § 39; Am.Jur., Habeas 
Corpus (1st ed § 55). 
[3] See Oa.l.Jur.2d, Insane and Incompetent Persons, § 138 et 
seq. 
McK. Dig. References: [1] Habeas Corpus, § 51; [2] Criminal 
Law, §§ 995; 1005; [3, 4] Criminal Law, § 236.1; [5] Criminal 
Law, § 236.1, 995; [6, 10] Habeas Corpus, § 34(1)(b); [7] Crimi-
nal Law, §§ 107, 1005; [8] Criminal Law, § 110; [9] CJ"iminal Law, 
§ 1440; [11] Constitutional Law, § 63; [12] Constitutional Law, 
§ 64; Criminal Law, § 995. 
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[4] IeL-Proceedings on Issue of Mentally Disordered Sex 01fend-
er.-Where a probationer, whose sentences for four crimes had 
been suspended, was committed to a state prison as a sexual 
psychopath in connection with a charge of statutory rape, his 
commitment brought him within the purpose of former Pen. 
Code, § 1203.2a, precluding outstanding probationary orders 
against one confined in a state prison and the uncertainty as to 
whether the court that granted probation would impose sen-
tence on the prisoner. 
[6] Id.-Proceedings on Issue of Mentally Disordered Sex 01fend-
er: Probation-Revocation.-Fairness to one committed to a 
state prison and proper' administration by prison officials and 
the Adult Authority require that outstanding convictions be 
reduced to judgment or be otherwise finally disposed of by 
termination of a trial court's jurisdiction. These considerations 
apply to one committed to a state prison as a sexual psycho-
path who would not benefit by hospital care, as well as to one 
sentenced to prison as a convicted felon . 
. [8] Habeas Oorpus-Grounds for Relief-Judgment or Sentence-
Pronouncement in Absence of Oounsel.-Pronouncement of 
judgment is a critical stage in a criminal prosecution when the 
constitutional rights "to appear and defend, in person and with 
counsel" (Const., art. I, § 13) apply, and a judgment pro-
nounced in violation of those rights can be attacked by habeas 
corpus. 
[7] Oriminal Law-Rights of Accused-Aid of Oounsel: Sentence 
-Formalities in Passing-Presence of Defendant and Oounsel. 
-At the pronouncement of judgment, there are substantial 
reasons for the presence of the accused and for the aid of 
counsel. Most defendants would be helpless in matters involving 
good cause for an arrest of judgment or a new trial, or the 
accused's insanity, or evidence and argument in mitigation of 
punishment when a choice of sentence is available, or the rein4 
statement of probation revoked in the accused's absence. 
Further an accused might allow the time for appeal to run in 
ignorance of the right to appeal and of grounds for reversal. 
[8] IeL-Rights of Accused-Aid of Oounsel-Waiver.-A waiver 
of the right to counsel at the pronouncement of judgment will 
not be implied from defendant's execution of a document recit-
ing only a waiver of his right to be personally present without 
any mention of the right to counsel. 
[9] Id.-Appeal-Reversible Error-Judgment and Sentence. - A 
jUdgment of conviction cannot stand where defendant was not 
aiforded the opportunity to have assistance of counsel at the 
time sentence was pronounced. 
[10] Habeas Oorpus-Grounds for Relief-Judgment or Sentence 
-Pronouncement in Absence of Oounsel.-In a proceeding in 
DC.acs ...... 
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habeas corpus, where nothing in the record shows any defect 
in the trial court's finding that defendant was guilty of the 
crimes for which he was sentenced, the trial court's unconstitu-
tional procedure, in pronouncing judgment and sentence 
without affording defendant the aid of counsel, ordinarily 
would not !ead to loss of power to impose a valid sentence. 
Defendant would be returned to the trial court to be arraigned 
for judgment with the opportunity there to show cause why 
judgment should not be pronounced. 
[11] Constitutional Law - Constitutionality of Statute - Partial 
Unconstitutionality.-Though part of a statute is declared 
unconstitutional, the remainder will stand where it is complete 
in itself and would have been adopted by the legislative body 
had it foreseen the partial invalidation. 
[12] Id.-Constitutionality of Statutes - Partial Unconstitution-
ality - Inseparable Provisions: Criminal Law - Probation-
Revocation.-Though deletion of the unconstitutional part of 
former Pen. Code, § 1203.2a, permitting imposition of a proba-
tioner's sentence in his absence when he was committed for 
another offense, would leave a coherent and complete statute, 
the Legislature would not have provided that court action 
under an unconstitutional procedure would lead to loss of 
jurisdiction to proceed constitutionally and would not have 
adopted the remaining constitutional part had it foreseen the 
partial invalidation. 
PROCEEDING in habeas corpus to secure release from 
custody. Petitioner discharged from the custody of prison 
authorities and committed to the custody of the sheriff of Los 
Angeles County for arraignment and pronouncement of judg-
ment; in all other respects, petition denied. 
George Anthony Perez, in pro. per., and Robert Y. Bell, 
under appointment by the Supreme Court, for Petitioner. 
Thomas C. Lynch, Attorney General, Edward P. 0 'Brien 
and Robert R. Granucci, Deputy Attorneys General, for Re-
spondent. 
TRAYNOR, C. J.-Petitioner attacks the validity of a 
judgment of the Los Angeles County Superior Court imposing 
concurrent sentences for two counts of lewd acts against chil-
dren (Pen. Code, § 288), one count of oral copulation (Pen. 
Code, § 288a), and one count of kidnaping (Pen. Code, § 207). 
Judgment was pronounced on March 28, 1963, while petitioner 
was confined in San Quentin State Prison. 
In 1959 the Los Angeles court found petitioner guilty of the 
four crimes, suspended the criminal proceedings, held sexual 
psychopathy hearings, and committed petitioner to a state 
/) 
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hospital for treatment. In 1960 he was returned to the superior 
court, the criminal proceedings were resumed, imposition of 
sentence was suspended, and petitioner was placed on proba-
tion for five years. 
In August 1962 petitioner pleaded guilty in Orange County 
to statutory rape. The Orange County Superior Court 
suspended the criminal proceedings and, after sexual psycho-
pathy hearings, committed petitioner to the Department of 
Mental Hygiene and ordered him delivered to the state prison 
for an indeterminate period. (WeIf. & Inst. Code, §§ 5512, 
5518.) In February 1963 he was received at· San Quentin State 
Prison under the Orange County commitment. He does not 
question the validity of that commitment. 
In June 1963, at the request of a correctional counselor, 
petitioner signed a document stating that the Los Angeles 
County Superior Court was authorized to impose sentence in 
his absence on the 1959 convictions. This document, quoted in 
the margin,1 does not mention' petitioner's right to counsel at 
the time of pronouncement of judgment and sentencing. A few 
days after petitioner signed this document he received a notice 
that he had been sentenced by the Los Angeles court and that 
his term on the four concurrent sentences commenced April 23, 
1963. 
In April 1966 petitioner in propria persona filed the instant 
petition for habeas corpus. We issued an order to show cause 
on the basis of his allegations that he had not understandingly 
waived his right to be present and represented by counsel 
when judgment was pronounced . 
. 
1
"
To THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA. COUNTY 01' 
Los ANGELES 
" Gentlemen: 
"1, GEORGE A. PEREZ, have heretofore been convicted in the above court 
of the offenses of Violation of Penal Code Sections 288, 288a, and 207. 
under Superior Court Case No. 212953. On December 16, 1960, the Judge 
of said court ordered that proceedings in the said matter be suspended 
without imposition of sentence and granted probation to me. 
"That thereafter, on or about August 13, 1962, the order of probation 
was revoked. Thereafter, on January 3, 1963, I was ordered committed 
to the Department of Mental Hygiene from the County of Orange, as a 
sexual psychopath, and am now incarcerated in the California Stati! 
Prison at San Quentin under identification number A-76012-S. 
" It is to my advantage that all offenses of which I have been con-
victed be dealt with by the Department of Corrections and the Adult 
Authority at one time, and I therefore respectfully request the above 
Superior Court to impose its sentence, heretofore withheld. 
, 'I know that I am entitled to be present in court at the time' sentence 
is pronounced against me, and I do specifically authorize such sentence to 
be imposed against me for the offenses hereinabove stated, Violation of 
Penal Code Sections 288, 288a, and 207, in my absence." 
) 
--) 
) 
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[1] Respondent urges that petitioner is not entitled to 
relief because he did not apply for the writ of habeas corpus 
until almost three years after he received notice that the Los 
Angeles court had imposed the sentence now attacked. Peti-
tioner's delay in applying for the writ is sufficiently explained 
by his allegations that when he entered the state prison he had 
not completed the seventh grade in school and knew nothing of 
legal rights or procedures, and that he has diligently used the 
limited opportunities available to prisoners for legal research 
and the preparation of legal documents. (See In re James 
(1952) 38 Ca1.2d 302, 309 [240 P.2d 596].) 
[2a] At the time the Los Angeles court imposed sentence, 
section 1203.2a of the Penal Code (Stats. 1943, ch. 321, p. 
1316) provided, and as since amended (Stats. 1963, ch. 2079) 
now provides, that when a defendant who was released on 
probation w.ithout imposition of sentence ''is' committed to a 
prison in this State for another offense" the court that 
granted probation, upon being notified of defendant's commit-
ment to prison, "shall" impose sentence or make some other 
order terminating its jurisdiction in defendant's case. [3] Pe-
titioner's confinement in prison was not under a commit-
ment based on a judgment of conviction of crime but was 
under the Orange County commitment as a sexual psychopath. 
That commitment, however, was "for another offense" within 
the meaning of Penal Code section 1203.2a since the proceed-
ings leading to such commitments of mentally disordered sex 
offende:r;'s begin with and rest on the conviction of a "criminal 
offense" (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 5501). [4] Moreover, the 
commitment to a state prison as a sexual psychopath brought 
petitioner within the purpose of section 1203.2a. That section 
precludes outstanding probationary orders against one con-
fined in a state prison and the uncertainty that would prevail 
as to when and whether the court that granted probation will 
seek to impose sentence on the prisoner. [5] Fairness to one 
committed to a state prison and proper administration by the 
prison officials and the Adult Authority require that such out-
standing convictions be reduced to judgment or be otherwise 
finally disposed of by termination of the trial court's jurisdic-
tion. These considerations apply to one committed to a state 
prison as a sexual psychopath who would not benefit by 
hospital care as well as to one sentenced to prison as a con-
victed felon. 
[2b] When the Los Angeles County Superior Court pro-
nounced judgment in 1963, section 1203.2a of the Penal Code 
purported to permit imposition of sentence in the absence of 
) 
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and without notice to one who had been released on probation 
and was thereafter committed to a state prison for another 
offense.2 [6] Pronouncement of judgment, however, is a 
critical stage in the criminal prosecution when the constitu-
tional rights "to appear and defend, in person and with 
counsel" (Cal. Const., art. I, § 13) apply, and a judgment 
pronounced in violation of those rights can be attacked by 
habeas corpus. (In re Levi (1952) 39 Ca1.2d 41, 46 [244 P.2d 
403] ; In re Boberts (1953) 40 Cal.2d 745, 748 [255 P.2d 782] ; 
In re Boyce (1959) 51 Ca1.2d 699 [336 P.2d 164] ; In re Klein 
(1961) 197 Cal.App.2d 58,63 [17 Cal.Rptr. 71].) 
[7] There are substantial reasons for the presence of 
accused and the aid of counsel at the pronouncement of judg-
ment. There may be good cause why judgment should not be 
pronounced (Pen. Code, § 12(0), e.g., the accused may be 
insane or have cause to offer in arrest of judgment or for a 
new trial (Pen. Code, § 1201); he may have evidence and 
2Seetion 1203.2a (State. 1943, ch. 321, p. 1316) then provided that 
"If !'By defendant who has been released on probation is committed to 
a prison in this State for another offense, the eourt which released him 
on probation shall have jurisdiction to impose sentence, if no sentence 
has previously been imposed for the offense for which he was granted 
probation, in the absence of the defendant. 
"The probation officer may, upon learning of such defendant's im-
prisonment, and must within 30 days after being notified in writing by 
the defendant or his eounsel, or the warden or superintendent or clerk 
of the prison in which the defendant is confined, report such commitment 
to the court which released the defendant on probation. 
"Upon being informed by the probation officer of the defendant's 
"confinement, or upon receipt from the warden, superintendent or clerk 
• • • of a certi1ieate showing that the defendant is confined in prison, 
the court shall issue its commitment if sentence has previously been 
imposed, . or shan impose sentence and issue its commitment if sentence 
has not previously been imposed, or shall make other final order terminat-
ing its jurisdiction over the defendant in the ease in which the order of 
probation was made, and if no such order is made within 30 days after 
the court has been noti1ied as herein provided of the defendant's con-
finement, then the court shall be deprived thereafter of any jurisdiction 
over the defendant in the ease on which he was granted probation. 
"Upon imposition of sentence hereunder the eommitment shall be 
dated as of the date upon which probation was granted and if the 
defendant is then in a State prison for an offense committed subsequent 
to the one upon which he has been on probation, the term of imprison-
JDent of such defendant under a commitment issued hereunder shall 
commence upon the date upon which defendant was delivered to prison 
under commitment for his subsequent offense, unless the court shall order 
that the sentence for the prior offense shall commence upon termination 
of the sentence for said subsequent offense. The sentence of the court 
may be imposed in the absence of the defendant in such cases. In the 
event the probation officer fails to report such commitment to the court 
or the court fails to impose sentence as herein provided, the court shall 
be deprived thereafter of all jurisdiction it may have retained in the 
granting of probation in said ease." 
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argument in mitigation of punishment when a choice 'of sen· 
tence is available; when probation has been revoked in his 
absence he may be able to show that it should be reinstated. 
Without the help of counsel most defendants would not know 
of and would be helpless to present these matters. Also they 
might allow the time for appeal to run in ignorance of the 
right to appeal and of grounds for reversal. (In re Levi 
(1952) supra, 39 Cal.2d at pp. 45-46; In re Turrieta (1960) 54 
Ca1.2d 816, 819 [8 Cal.Rptr. 737, 356 P.2d 681] ; In re Klein. 
(1961) supra, 197 Cal.App.2d at p. 65; In re Jordan (1966) 
242 CaI.App.2d 254, 257-258 [51 Cal.Rptr. 221]; see also 
People v. De Waele (1964) 224 Cal.App.2d 512, 515 [36 Cal. 
Rptr.825].) 
Thus, In re Klein, supra, 197 Cal.App.2d at pp. 62, 65, 
specifically held that pronouncement of judgment under the 
provision o£ section 1203.2a purporting to authorize sentencing 
in the absence of defendant violated the rights" to appear and 
defend, in person and with counsel" (Cal. Const., art. I, 
§ 13), and that acceptance of probation by the accused did not 
imply acquiescence in that provision of section 1203.2a and 
waiver of those constitutional rights.3 
Here, as in Klein., the record shows no actual waiver of those 
rights by petitioner when he accepted probation. The waiver 
relied on by respondent was made when petitioner signed the 
document quoted supra, footnote 1, after judgment had been 
pronounced on March 28, 1963, in his absence. Respondent 
argues that by signing that document, with its express recital 
authorizing imposition of sentence in his absence, petitioner 
3The Legislature recognized the holdings of such eases as KZein. and 
Levi by amendment of section 1203.2a (Stats. 1963, ch. 2079, effective 
September 20, 1963, after this petitioner's sentence and asserted waiver) 
to provide that a defendant committed for another crime could be 
sentenced in his absence by the court that had withheld imposition of 
sentence only "on the request of the defendant made through his 
counsel, or by himself in writing, if such writing is signed in the presence 
of the warden or superintendent of the prison in which he is confined 
or the duly authorized representative of the warden or superintendent. 
and such warden or superintendent or his representative attests both 
that the defendant has made and signed such request and that he states 
that he wishes the court to impose sentence in the case in which he was 
released on probation, in his absence and without his being represented 
by counsel. 
" . . . . . . . . . . . . 
, '. . . If the case is one in which sentence has not previously been 
imposed, the court is deprived of jurisdiction over defendant if it does 
not impose sentence and issue its commitment or make other final order 
terminating its jurisdiction over defendant in the ease within 30 days 
after defendant has, in the manner prescribed by this section, requested 
imposition of sentence." 
~) 
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impliedly waived his right to the aid of counsel at the time of 
sentence. . [8] We have refused to imply a waiver of the 
right to counsel from the mere presence of the accused when 
judgment is pronounced (In re Levi, supra, 39 Cal.2d at pp. 
46-47; In re Roberts, supra., 40 Ca1.2d at p. 748; In re Boyce, 
supra, 51 Ca1.2d at p. 700; In re Turrieta, supra, 54Ca1.2d at 
p. 820) ; similarly here, a waiver of the right to counsel will 
not be implied from petitioner's execution of a document that 
recites only a waiver .of the right to personal presence and 
does not mention the right to counsel. 
[9] Since petitioner was not afforded the opportunity to 
have assistance of counsel when the Los Angeles court pro-
nounced sentence, its judgment cannot stand, and we need not 
resolve the factual question presented by petitioner's allega-
tions that his waiver of the right to be present in person was 
incompetent because he signed the document without under-
standing its effect. 
[10] Nothing in the present record shows any defect in the 
finding of the Los Angeles court that petitioner was guilty of 
the four crimes. In such a case the subsequent unconstitutional 
procedure at the time of sentence ordinarily would not lead to 
loss or power to impose a valid sentence. The prisoner would 
be returned to the trial court to be arraigned for judgment 
with the opportunity there to show cause why judgment 
should not be pronounced. (In re Levi, supra, 39 Ca1.2d 41, 
47.) [2c] Section 1203.2a as it read when petitioner was 
sentenced (Stats. 1943, ch. 321, p. 1316) provided, however, 
that unless the superior court imposed sentence within 30 days 
after it was notified of the defendant's confinement in a state 
prison the court was "deprived thereafter of any jurisdiction 
over the defendant" in the case in which the order of proba-
tion was made. If this last quoted provision of section 1203.2a 
as it formerly read remained in effect despite the invalidity of 
the provision permitting imposition of sentence in the defend-
ant's absence and despite the section's omission of any provi-
sion securing the defendant's right to counsel, petitioner and 
others similarly situated could never be punished for crimes 
that led to imposition of sentences in a manner purportedly 
but unconstitutionally authorized by the Legislature. 
[11] "When part of a statute is declared unconstitutional, 
tIle remainder will stand if it is complete in itself and would 
have been adopted by the legislative body had the latter fore-
seen the partial invalidation of the statute." (In re Bell 
(1942) 19 Ca1.2d 488, 498 [122 P.2d 22] ; see Estate of Phil-
) 
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lips (1928) 203 Cal. 106, 113 [263 P. 1017].) [12] Deletion 
of the unconstitutional part of former section 1203.2a would 
leave a coherent statute complete in itself, but not one that the 
Legislature would have adopted had it foreseen the partial 
invalidation of the statute. We do not believe that the Legis-
lature would have provided that court action under an uncon-
stitutional procedure should nevertheless lead to loss of 
jurisdiction to proceed constitutionally. The statutory plan 
that the Legislature would have adopted had it foreseen that 
former section 1203.2a was in part unconstitutional is indi-
cated by the 1963 amendment of the section. That amendment 
does not simply delete the unconstitutional provision for the 
imposition of sentence in the defendant's absence, but pro-
vides a different procedure that recognizes the defendant's 
right to be present and represented by counsel. (See People v. 
Fisherman (965) 237 Cal.App.2d 356, 361-362 [47 Cal.Rptr. 
33].) 
Before the enactment of section 1203.2a, a court that had 
suspended imposition of sentence and granted probation to one 
who later found himself in the situation of this petitioner or 
of Klein (197 Cal.App.2d 58) or Fisherman (237 Cal.App.2d 
356) did not lose jurisdiction to impose sentence because of 
lapse of time. If probation was timely revoked, judgment 
could be imposed at any time thereafter. (See People v. Wil-
liams (1944) 24 Cal.2d 848, 853 [151 P.2d 244] ; People v. 
Siegel (1965) 235 Cal.App.2d 522, 524 [45 Cal.Rptr. 530).) 
[2d] We conclude that a prisoner unconstitutionally sen-
tenced under section 1203.2a 8$ it read before the 1963 amend-
ment is in the same position he would have been in had there 
been no such statute; that is, unless he competently waives his 
rights to be present and represented by counsel at the time of 
pronouncement of judgment, he is entitled to be properly 
arraigned for jUdgment. The court that originally granted 
probation is not deprived of jurisdiction to imp.ose sentence by 
the 30-day provision of section 1203.2a. (People v. Fisherman, 
supra, 237 Cal.App.2d at pp. 361-362.) 
The petitioner is discharged from the custody of the 
authorities at San Quentin State Prison and is committed to 
the custody of the sheriff of Los Angeles County with direc-
tions that petitioner be arraigned for pronouncement of judg-
ment in accordance with this opinion. In all other respects the 
petition is denied. 
McComb, J., Peters, J., Tobriner, J., Peek, J., Mask, J., and 
Burke, J., concurred. 
J( 
